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Assumed Rates of Discount for Valuations of Publicly
Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans
Abstract
Actuaries commonly, and in accordance with professional standards, use
expected rates of return (on an anticipated asset mix) to discount the
liabilities of defined benefit pension plans and to develop periodic plan
expenses and contributions. With risky assets, the symmetry of returns
about the expected return is deemed sufficient to develop costs that are
unbiased over time. In the public (governmental) plan sector, expenses
and contributions are almost always identical and intergenerational equity
is a high priority.
This paper uses arbitrage principles to show that the use of expected
returns including equity premia is biased in favor of early generations at
the expense of later generations, a wealth transfer disguised as risk
diversification over time. It is shown that unbiased results can be
developed, with no wealth transfers between generations, by assuming
risk-free rates of return independently of the actual asset mix.
Because cost computations anticipate equity premia, governments are
likely to offer their employees pension benefits and valuable options
(Skim funds) at less than their risk-adjusted cost, and to enter into costly
strategies such as the issuance of Pension Obligation Bonds (POB’s).

I

Introduction

Public sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans invest substantially in both equities and
fixed income securities. Actuarial Standard of Practice Number 27 (ASOP 27, Appendix
A) promulgated by the Actuarial Standards Board says that the actuarial valuation of
defined benefit pension plans should take the mix of assets into account when
computing plan liabilities and annual costs and contributions.

Assumed investment

returns and discount rates must fall into a best-estimate range defined around the
expected return on the anticipated asset allocation. Thus the resulting rate is usually
well above the risk-free rate for the life of the pension liabilities.

The actuarial literature, including ASOP 27, justifies the use of expected return as an
unbiased estimate of the rates of return that will be earned by the plan assets over the
life of the liabilities. It is understood that actual returns will deviate from those expected

1
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and that better-than-expected returns in some years will offset worse-than-expected
returns in others. It is also anticipated that, in future years, expected rates of return will
vary and that plan actuaries will then change the assumed rate of return accordingly.

An immediate implication of the procedure described above is that plans that invest
more heavily in equities require lower levels of funding and that these lower levels
usually may be realized immediately upon setting the asset allocation. Although it is
recognized that higher expected rates of return must be associated with greater
uncertainty with respect to future returns, year-by-year valuations incorporate no explicit
recognition of these differing levels of risk.

This paper uses the lessons of modern finance to criticize the actuarial process for
determining annual costs for public sector pension plans.

I argue that the use of

expected return without adjustment for risk constitutes a wealth transfer among
generations with the current generation enjoying the benefit of risks that must be borne
by later generations. It is shown that, although the actuarial assumption employed is
unbiased with respect to anticipated returns, it is not unbiased with respect to risks. The
intergenerational transfers may be represented as a borrowing by the first generation
(Gen1) upon which interest is paid by all future generations (GenK, K>1) with the
principal repayment left as an additional onus for the final generation (GenΩ).

Actuarial principles, as contrasted with actuarial assumptions under ASOP 27, support
risk recognition.

This paper argues that the current prescription is flawed. Regardless

of the actual allocation of assets, the risk-adjusted unbiased plan cost is computed using
risk-free rates applicable to the time horizons of the pension liabilities.

This paper addresses public sector pension plans.

Very similar arguments may be

applied to defined benefit pension plans maintained by private corporations. ASOP 27
applies to both public and private defined benefit pension plans. The decision to focus
on the public sector is derived from the “cleaner laboratory” presented in the public area.
The cleanliness of the laboratory arises from a common practice in the public sector,
wherein annual contributions to the plan and accounting expenses for the sponsor are
almost always identical. The word costs is used throughout the paper to refer to either
or both of these concepts except when greater specificity is necessary. Neither the
2
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accounting rules of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) nor the statutes
and regulations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) are applied in
the public area (although less restrictive Governmental Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) accounting rules often apply as well as state and local statutes).

As a

consequence, most actuaries practicing in the public sector are able to work with a
single set of books of account. Another aspect of the cleaner laboratory is that the taxexempt status of pension trusts matches the nontaxability of governmental entities in
contrast to the taxability of corporations

The remainder of this section discusses the defined benefit contract, the funding
rationale, the role of Actuarial Cost Methods (ACM’s) and Actuarial Assumptions, and
the historical development of the standards for setting assumptions.

The defined benefit pension contract and the funding rationale
Defined benefit pension plans implement long-term contracts between the plan sponsor
and its employees, under which employees accept some of their total compensation in
the form of promised annuities commencing after employment ends. The contract terms
are frequently complicated and may embed options, forfeitures, qualifying age and
service rules, etc. The group nature of the contract makes it necessarily true that an
individual employee almost never receives a promise set1 that matches the economic
value of his or her particular wage concession. This may be thought of as a socialization
principle or, if individual economic equity is a high priority for the reader, it may be
assumed that the total ex-ante compensation varies with the individual circumstances of
the employee.

It is a common conceptual error to assume that the conceded wages form a fund that is
invested on behalf of the employees. Part of this misconception arises from the legal
definitions with respect to the responsibilities of the plan’s trustees2. More arises from

1

2

For every plan participant and at every point in time, there exists a set of contingent benefits
that may vary by age, future employment, future pay, marital status, etc. The entire set is
promised to the employee by the defined benefit pension contract.
There is a colloquial understanding that a fiduciary must cause the plan to be administered in
the best interests of the plan participants. More accurately, the plan must be administered so
that the employee promises are protected. There is no mandate to act in any fashion to
expand the promises beyond those made by the sponsor.

3
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the negotiating process wherein total group concessions may equate to some (perhaps
miscalculated) measure of employer costs.

Further, some very poorly informed

employees may confuse defined benefit and defined contribution arrangements.

It is conceptually more accurate to view the DB contract as an exchange of part of total
current compensation for a promise set. The fact that many plans based in the United
States do accumulate assets does not mean that these assets should be viewed as an
accumulating investment of deferred wages.

In the case of public DB plans which, unlike most private plans, frequently require
employee contributions, the assets-as-deferred-wages concept is harder to shed. A
corporate finance analogy may help. The promise made to bondholders of a corporation
is fixed regardless of the performance of corporate assets. When default is an issue, the
promise may be subject to contingencies, but the promise itself does not include a share
of asset performance beyond that necessary to deliver the contractual amount. This is
true despite the fact that bondholders may have supplied the very funds that purchased
the assets.

Similarly, contributing employees of a public fund are entitled to fixed

promises in exchange for reduced salaries as well as for that portion of their salaries that
comprises the contribution requirement3.

The plan assets should be viewed as a segregated portion of the assets of the sponsor,
set aside to serve particular purposes. This segregation is strong; these assets are
unreachable for other purposes until all the plan obligations have been satisfied. In the
private sector, ERISA makes funding a requirement in order to provide collateral for
long-term promises made by a knowledgeable (but not necessarily financially strong)
employer to vulnerable employees. Further, under ERISA, where the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation is inserted into the gap between promises made and promises
kept, funding reduces the risks and some of the moral hazard associated with
governmental guarantees of private promises.

3

One might ask why have employee contributions rather than just lower pay? The inclusion of
employee contributions has achieved various purposes historically. It allows higher nominal
pay rates to be offered to prospective employees, persuades taxpayers that they do not bear
the full cost, provides backloading of benefits in favor of longer service older employees,
commits employees to the success of the plan and strengthens the bargaining position of
employee representatives with respect to investments and benefits, etc.

4
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In the public sector, it has been argued that, because of the taxing power of most
sponsors and because accounting expenses are almost always identical to the amount
of funds contributed, the primary rationale for funding is to provide an opportunity for a
system of intergenerational equity (Peskin, 1999). This paper will show that the actuarial
processes employed squander this opportunity.

The role of actuarial cost methods and actuarial assumptions
Because the operation of a defined benefit plan implements a long-term exchange
contract, and because terms of the exchange are subject to periodic updating, it is
necessary to employ actuarial valuations as a navigational tool through time.

Actuarial valuations are the periodic (almost always annual) financial analyses of the
assets and liabilities of a pension plan leading to the development of a schedule (a
vector) of future plan costs. Every valuation employs an Actuarial Cost Method (ACM), a
set of data, and a set of actuarial assumptions.

The cost method is the procedure that develops the future periodic costs vector, subject
to the constraint that the accumulation of actuarial assets, future contributions and
investment returns is exactly sufficient to meet all benefits when due:

Present Value of Future Benefits (PVFB) =
Actuarial Asset Value (AAV) + Present Value of Future Costs (PVFC)

Benefits are projected using assumptions about deaths, retirements, terminations of
employment, salaries and such other factors as the plan may use to define the benefits
that it will pay. The vector of projected benefits is then discounted at the assumed
interest rate to yield the PVFB. Note that the “closed group” valuations used to develop
plan costs do not include future hires. Special “forecast” valuations may incorporate
future hires4. For a discussion of the particularities of various cost methods, see Berin
(1976), McGill et al (1996), Trowbridge (1952), Trowbridge and Farr (1976).

4

McGill et al (1996), pp. 272
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The computation of the Actuarial Asset Value is defined as part of the ACM. ERISA,
FASB and GASB all require that the AAV be “market-related”. Typically, the AAV is a
weighted average of recent market values subject to a market-based minimum and
maximum.

The use of the AAV in lieu of the market value of the assets has two

implications. The first is that asset realization is effectively smoothed to a greater extent
than is the realization of other actuarial assumptions. For the purposes of this paper,
this is a matter of degree and not of direction. All smoothing activities are modeled
herein as a spreading of the difference between realization and expectation over some
future period of time. The second implication is addressed in GASB 25 paragraph 36c
which indicates that the assumed interest rate should be developed with consideration
given to the basis used to determine the AAV. This may be understood to suggest that
when the AAV is greater (lesser) than the market value of the assets, the actuary will
reduce (increase) any interest rate assumed for the future from that which might be
deduced from the current state of the market alone.

As noted in Section IV, this

suggested understanding is weakly communicated and may often be ignored in practice

The PVFC is the balancing item in the constraint above. Since the AAV is not itself a
function of the assumed discount rate, the direction of change in the PVFC will follow the
direction of change in the PVFB. As a result, the PVFC will rise or fall as the assumed
discount rate is decreased or increased.

An integral part of every ACM is the treatment of gains or losses (Dreher, 1960) so that
the constraint equation is self-correcting and valid in every period. Also inherent in every
method is a procedure for translating the PVFC into a vector of projected (scheduled)
future costs.

The differences in ACM’s are primarily differences in how these two

functions are performed.

Aggregate methods generally divide the PVFC into two pieces: the Present Value of
Future Normal Costs (PVFNC) and the Unfunded Accrued Liability (UAL)5.

The

prescription for this division is an element of the ACM and for the purposes of this paper
may be treated as arbitrary. The PVFNC is divided by the PV Future Payroll to get a
percentage which is then applied to the future pay vector to determine each future year’s

6
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expected normal cost. The UAL is often amortized by dividing it by an annuity certain to
generate a level dollar amount per year for the period certain.

GASB additionally

recognizes a method that amortizes the UAL over future payrolls projected for a certain
period6. The cost vector may then be computed as the amortization vector plus the
product of the normal cost percentage and the projected future pay vector.

Accrued methods also develop a UAL and amortize it. The accrued methods develop
the normal cost as the PV of benefits deemed to be accrued in each future year. This
contrasts with the aggregate methods in that future normal costs are not expected to be
a constant percentage of the projected payroll.

The process for allocating the PVFC over future periods (in essence, the ACM)
incorporates historic notions about the “right” way to recognize the impact of accruing
pension liabilities over the working lifetimes of employees. The accrued benefit methods
may be understood to follow a “yearly renewable term” premium structure borrowed from
life insurance contracts.

The aggregate methods follow a structure based on “level

premium life”. Some methods level the annual costs individual by individual (individual
methods) and then sum them to get values for the group, while others (aggregate
methods) develop level (as a percentage of payroll) costs for the group directly.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to observe that every method allocates the PVFC over
time somewhat arbitrarily.

Because some of the allocation procedures use interest

sensitive measures (e.g., PVFP) in the denominator of some of the calculations, the
inverse relationship between the discount rate and the PVFC is not always transmitted to
the first term (the current year’s cost) of the cost vector. It may be shown that no ACM is
immune to this “pathology” given an unusual combination of data and assumptions.
Nonetheless, it is almost always the case that the current year’s cost is inversely related
to the assumed discount rate.

5
6

Under the traditional “Aggregate” method, the UAL is defined to be zero.
GASB 25, paragraph 36f3
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Historical development of the standards for setting assumptions
Appendix A summarizes those provisions of Actuarial Standard of Practice 27 that
pertain to setting assumed rates of discount. ASOP 27 is firmly rooted in actuarial
processes that were developed during the 1960’s as pension plans began to include
substantial investments in equities.

Prior to that time, many pension plans were insured and most pension plans invested
almost exclusively in fixed income securities. With stable interest rates prevailing in the
post-War years, and with commercial computers of a rudimentary sort not arriving until
the late 1950’s, most actuaries carried fixed income investments at book value and
adjusted discount rates very infrequently. The ACM’s, which were developed somewhat
earlier and summarized by Trowbridge (1952), were designed to provide a smooth and
self-correcting accumulation of assets sufficient to meet plan liabilities.

During the 1950’s and 1960’s, a movement to unbundle pension management gained
momentum. Plans were taken out of insurance companies. Uninsured, “trusteed”, plans
required investment, actuarial and administrative services that were frequently delivered
by independent parties. A major virtue of the trusteed plans was their ability to invest in
equities. A seeming drawback was the volatility that this might impose upon annual
pension costs. Even though the ACM’s described by Trowbridge already smoothed
actuarial gains and losses over many years, the traditional book value treatment was not
an adequate approach to valuing equities and particularly for actively managed equities.7
Various ways of defining the actuarial value of assets were developed (Hamilton and
Jackson, 1968). Schemes that balanced the recognition of equity returns against the
desired smoothness of costs gained favor.

The priority of smoothness and the expectation that equity would reduce costs in the
long run led naturally to the use of assumed discount rates that included premia for the
expected returns on equities in excess of that expected for fixed income investments.

7

Note that the book value of an equity portfolio is essentially a trailing average of the market
value of each security on its acquisition date; active turnover would cause book value to approach
market value; inactive management would leave equities at outdated values.
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Contemporaneously with the development of actuarial processes to derive pension costs
(essentially an accounting methodology), economists looking at the securities markets
began to develop financial economics. Modigliani and Miller (1958) applied the arbitrage
concept to assert that an investment that may be replicated by another must, absent
arbitrage, carry the same price. Although the use of expected returns unadjusted for risk
violates this proposition, there seemed to be little reason for actuaries to adjust a thirtyyear funding plan to incorporate lessons that, even if then known to the actuaries, would
appear to apply to the short-lived prices at which securities were traded.

Various accounting opinions and IRS rulings codified the actuarial processes in the
years prior to the enactment of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (1974).
The primary accounting opinion was Opinion No. 8 of the Accounting Principles Board
(APB 8, 1966) which identified mainstream ACM’s and provided guidance with respect to
the periods over which unfunded liabilities and actuarial gains and losses had to
amortized. IRS rulings also identified the major generic ACM’s and provided limitations
on the number of years over which unfunded liabilities could be funded on a taxdeductible basis. Although the IRS rules applied to amounts contributed to plans and
APB 8 applied to the sponsors’ books of account, most employers could contribute and
account using the same numbers.

ERISA provided further formal (statutory) codification of the rules that the IRS had
developed on a slimmer statutory footing in earlier years.

ERISA also added the

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as an insurer of employee pensions promised by
companies that were unable to meet the promises, minimum funding standards based
on common ACM’s and limited amortization periods, codification of pension-specific
fiduciary standards, and the rule that actuarial assumptions had to be “reasonable” in the
aggregate. This latter rule meant that a conscious underestimate of the discount rate
might be offset by a consistent underestimate of future pay increases or that low rates of
assumed mortality might be offset by low estimates of plan expenses. There was no
consideration given to the appropriateness, or lack thereof, of the expected-returns
approach to setting the discount rate.

The use of offsetting assumptions predated and survived ERISA. From an economist’s
perspective, the use of offsetting assumptions makes comparative statics unreliable.

9
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Even though the plans might be in some long-term balance and even though the annual
cost might be, in some sense, “right”, the marginal cost relationships are distorted by this
offset process. This distortion has at least two major implications:
•

The marginal cost of benefit changes, including optional forms of benefits, is only
likely to be comparable to a change in current wages (for which such benefits are
often exchanged in negotiations) by accident.

•

Investment products may be designed to allow plan managers to achieve their
desired goals regardless of the merits of the investments. Opaque methodologies
and inaccurate marginal costs encourage manipulation by plan managers to the
potential detriment of employees or principals (taxpayers or shareholders).

In 1985 the Financial Accounting Standards Board (successor to the APB) approved and
promulgated FAS 87 which became effective for fiscal years beginning after December
15, 1986. This standard superseded FAS 36 which had become effective in 1980 as a
post-ERISA successor to APB 8. Unlike ERISA whose cost rules apply entirely to plan
contributions, FAS 87 applies entirely to employer accounting for pension costs.

The provisions of FAS 87 that are most pertinent to this paper are briefly summarized in
Appendix B. FAS 87 introduced the idea that each significant assumption must “reflect
the best estimate of the plan’s future experience solely with respect to that plan
assumption”8. In those instances where the subject is corporate books of account, the
use of offsetting assumptions no longer applied.

FAS 87 moved the compromise

between financial reality and accounting smoothness towards the former despite the
objections of the advocates of the latter.

How the provisions of FAS 87 reinforce or mitigate the arguments of this paper as they
might be applied to the private plan sector is discussed in Section VI.

The plans that constitute the primary subject of this paper are governed neither by
ERISA nor by FAS 87.

Public plans are governed by the statutes of states and

municipalities and, for some federally sponsored plans, by federal law. The accounting
8

FAS 87, paragraph 191.
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for such plans is the province of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
a sister organization of FASB under the umbrella of the Financial Accounting
Foundation.

After circulating some FAS 87-like proposals within the public plan

community, the GASB released in November, 1994, GASB 25 which applies to the
books of account of the public pension plan and GASB 27 which applies to the sponsor
books of account. Despite the later publication date, these rulings are more like the FAS
35/36 updates of APB 8 than they are like FAS 87. In particular, they recognize all the
common ACM’s and allow substantial flexibility with respect to amortization periods.
They defer to ASOP 27 (as a successor to ASOP 4) with respect to the setting of
discount rates, which are not distinguished from expected returns on plan assets. Thus
the GASB statements incorporate the use of expected returns that include estimated risk
premia for equity and other investments. The statements require that each assumption’s
reasonableness “should be considered independently based on its own merits, its
consistency with each other assumption, and the combined impact of all assumptions.”9
This appears to be similar to the FAS 87 admonition that each assumption be developed
without contemplation of offsets.

ASOP 27 (1996) is the latest pronouncement by the actuarial profession with respect to
the setting of the economic assumptions for use in valuing defined benefit pension plans.
It replaces that part of ASOP 4 (last revised in 1993) that deals with economic
assumptions. ASOP 27 refines, but does not correct, earlier actuarial attempts to apply
the lessons of finance to the selection of economic assumptions.

II

Model Approach

Actuarial Cost Methods are accounting procedures used to develop periodic (annual)
pension costs. The costs so developed may be used to account for the expenses of the
plan sponsor or as a budgeting plan for contributions to the plan by its sponsor, or both.

The methods incorporate complex details which vary from method to method. Strictly
modeling each method in order to demonstrate the thesis of this paper would surely be
to lose the forest for the trees. This paper will, instead, rely on a simpler generic model
containing the critical common elements of all ACM’s. This model is built in steps in
9

GASB 25, paragraph 36b.
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It includes:

the promise of a defined benefit made during the working

lifetimes of plan participants; the discounting of the promise for the time value of money;
the concept of gain and loss arising from the distinction between expected returns on
risky assets and the realized returns thereon; and the spreading of such gains and
losses over periods that exceed the time over which any particular gain or loss arises.
The model does not deal with demographic assumptions and variations in their
realization, taking these assumptions as perfect forecasts.

Furthermore, the model

includes an implicit assumption that defined benefits are accurately modeled as nominal
bond-like promises. Section V deals with the more general case where promises include
components correlated with the excess returns on equities.

The model marks time in “periods” of unspecified length.

For the purposes of the

Results other than Result 5, it is appropriate to recognize that a period might be roughly
in the range of twenty to forty years. Thus risk-free returns would be represented by
long bonds. Equity returns would be represented by total returns on an index using
models that assume neither mean-reversion nor trend-following, implying that equity risk
is persistent and grows with the square-root of the length of the period.

With the

duration of plan liabilities frequently as great as fifteen years, the use of an expected
return on equities for a fund half invested in equities will result in a liability roughly onethird less than a liability computed using risk-free rates.

For Result 5, where spreading risks over multiple time periods is the focus, it is
appropriate to think of annual periods with gains and losses being actuarially spread
over fifteen to thirty one-year periods.

III

Results

This section develops a simple generic model of the actuarial treatment of investment
risk and the spreading thereof across generations of taxpayers. The first result provides
the sign of the derivative of actuarial cost with respect to the interest rate assumption
and observes that some rare combinations of methods, assumptions and data may
contradict the general rule. The later results develop the model.

12
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The use of higher interest rate assumptions always leads to a
reduction in the present value of future costs and almost always
lowers this year’s actuarial cost.

It would seem to be self-evident that raising the assumed interest rate would always
lower this year’s cost.

It is a peculiar aspect of actuarial cost methods that this

statement is not true for any of the common actuarial cost methods10.

As outlined in Section I, the Present Value of Future Costs is inversely related to the
assumed discount rate. This is not surprising. What is surprising is that the first entry in
the cost vector is not necessarily decreasing in the interest rate. While the cases where
this first (or current) period cost does not decrease with rising interest rate assumptions
are rare and may be considered to be, in some sense, pathological, it is not clear
whether the pathology is in the unusual data sets that cause this effect (frequently
comprised of workforces where most of the actively employed are close to retirement
age) or in the weak design and arbitrary nature of the actuarial methods.

Having noted that this year’s costs generally, but not always, decline with rising
assumed interest rates, we will, hereinafter, address only those well-behaved cases that
represent all but a miniscule fraction of defined benefit pension plans.

Result 2:

Adjusting the assumed interest rate to reflect a change in equity
allocation upward is a windfall for the generation that does it.

ASOP 27 indicates that the marginal effect of an increase in the anticipated equity
allocation should be an increase in the assumed interest rate. Assuming that Result 1 is
effective, any increase in the assumed interest rate will lower this year’s cost
independently of whether it is accompanied (justified?) by a change in the asset
allocation. In the sense that risk premia are earned entirely by the bearers of the risk,
such a decrease in current costs cannot be earned by the generation that changes the
interest rate assumption even if the asset allocation is changed as well.

10

All of the

The statement is true for the special case of the FAS 87 pension expense when only the
expected return on assets is increased.
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increased risk associated with the greater equity exposure will be faced by future
generations yet some of the risk premium is being expropriated by this generation.

The following example will serve to illustrate this point and to initiate the model that will
be used to evaluate later results as well. Define:
α = fraction invested in equities; 1 - α = fraction invested in riskless asset
r = riskless rate of return 11
_

~

q = expected return on equities; q = actual return on equities
_

_

~

~

e = expected return on asset mix = α q + (1 - α )r; e = actual return on asset mix = α q + (1 - α )r

Employees of the municipal system work for one period and are retired in the following
period at which time they receive a fixed sum promised to them at the beginning of the
employment period.

Taxpayers live for two periods.

In the first period, they are

endowed with assets that will be used for their expenses in the second period and which
they invest in the securities markets during period one. In the second period, they
consume all of their assets net of taxes. The tax obligation includes an amount that will
be invested by the municipal pension plan in order to meet the retirement benefits of
those municipal employees whose work period is contemporaneous with the
consumption period of the taxpayers. Taxpayers are also obligated to make up any
actuarial losses (shortfall) or receive any actuarial gains (longfall) left by the previous
generation of taxpayers. The populations of taxpayers and municipal employees are
stationary and the benefits promised to retirees translate into $1 per taxpayer. Thus:

Generation 1 of taxpayers (Gen1) promises to pay $1 in period two to municipal
employees of period one. Gen1 sets aside (“funds”, used as a verb) this promise with
$1 discounted for one period. Gen2 promises and funds for $1 payable in period three
and is held responsible for paying $1 in period two using the investment proceeds of the
Gen1 funding.

11

The term structure of risk-free rates applicable to the liability cash flows.
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In accordance with ASOP 27, the rate of return used in the discount process is the
expected rate of return taking into account the anticipated asset allocation, i.e.:
Funding per taxpayer in Gen1 = F1 =

1
_

1+ e
~

Funding per taxpayer in Gen2 = F2 =

1
_

+ 1-

1+ e

1+ e
_

1+ e

where the last term in the Gen2 funding formula represents the proceeds of the Gen1
funding invested using the anticipated allocation and, since the promise is to pay $1, the
last two terms constitute the actuarial gains or losses carried from Gen1.

Since the last two terms combined with the existing fund are just sufficient to make good
on the Gen1 promise, the remaining (first) term constitutes the Gen2 funding for period
three. Since this is identical to the Gen1 funding for period two, it is clear that all GenK
(K>1) face the same situation as each other. Note further that the expected value of
Gen2 funding is exactly equal to the actual Gen1 funding.
Assuming that α > 0, it is clear that Gen2 faces some uncertainty that was not faced by
Gen1. This represents a cost (price of risk) to Gen2 that Gen1 did not bear. If α = 0,
then such uncertainty will not be passed from Gen1 to Gen2 and each Fk will be identical
and will equal the risk-free discount of $1. F1 is a decreasing function of α. Although the
expected value of F2 is a also a decreasing function of α, the uncertainty of F2 is an
increasing function of α.
Note that the risk borne by Gen1 is not a function of α. In fact, there is no risk borne by
Gen1. The decrease in F1 associated with values of α > 0 constitutes a windfall for
Gen1. Similarly, any increase in α subsequent to the first period represents a windfall
for the initiating generation and any decrease amounts to a payment for part of an earlier
generation's windfall.

Result 3:

Using an interest rate higher than the risk-free rate to compute the
cost of any benefit increase constitutes a windfall for the generation
that does it.
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This may be seen to be an application of the principle of Result 2. With respect to the
new benefit level, the granting generation enjoys the Gen1 advantage outlined above.
Simply deconstruct the new benefit level of $(1+b) into $1 of continuing benefit with
respect to which GenK has no special ranking and $b with respect to which GenK enjoys
a windfall.

Note that this windfall may not belong to the taxpayer members of the granting
generation. If the new benefit is exchanged for a wage concession equal to:
b
1+ r

then the windfall belongs to the taxpayers. If, as is almost always the case in practice,
the wage concession is computed as:
b
_

1+ e

then the windfall has been consumed by the employees and a new windfall will inure to
future employees in every subsequent generation, assuming no subsequent adjustments
in wages or benefit levels.

Result 4:

The windfalls enjoyed by initiating generations come at cost to
subsequent generations, a cost that is not ameliorated by equity
investments.

It is tempting to believe that the windfall enjoyed by Gen1 is but the first of a series of
such gains that may be enjoyed by future generations as long as the equity exposure is
maintained across generations. I.e., generations who agree to diversify across time may
pool their mutual risks and share the rewards. In fact, the actuarial methods we are
studying herein do not achieve such sharing12.

Consider the base case where each generation funds $1 discounted in accordance with
the riskless rate. In this base case each generation pays a certain:

12

Intergenerational risk sharing through tax policy is possible (Smetters, 2000).
Our
observation is that pension actuarial methods do not implement such sharing between those
taxpayers who promise pension benefits and those who must make good on the promise.
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1
1+ r

This may be compared to the case where, for K > 1, GenK faces an uncertain:
_

~

1
_

+ 1-

1+ e

1+ e
_

1+ e

=

~

1+ e - e
_

1+ e

Can we determine which of these cases is preferable? Certainly the expected cost of
the second case is lower than that of the base case for all α > 0. While we might posit a
risk averse utility function that would permit us to answer the preference question, the
answer would turn out to be a direct result of the utility function formulation. Instead, we
shall employ arbitrage pricing to determine taxpayer preferences.

In order to compute an optimal asset allocation for the investments they make during
their first period of life, taxpayers desire to compute the riskless value of the obligation
that they will be required to pay as taxes during their second period. But this amount is
only riskless in the base case. Faced with the uncertain case, the taxpayer may elect to
take a short equity position equal to

α

and invest that amount in the risk-free asset.

_

1+ e

As a result the taxpayer’s effective pension funding obligation will become:
_

FK =

1+ e - r
_

=B +D

1+ e
_

where B ≡

1
_

and D ≡

1+ e

e-r
_

1+ e

What relationship does this bear to the base case? If α = 0, it is identical to the base
case. An examination of the first derivative of Fk with respect to α shows that it is strictly
positive and thus Fk is a strictly increasing function of the equity exposure. In effect, our
taxpayer must, after hedging the risk, be poorer than with the base case and become
progressively poorer as α increases. This is not all together surprising since Gen1’s
windfall is increasing in α as well.
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It is useful at this point to observe the Gen1 advantage which may be defined relative to
the base case:
_

Gen1 advantage =

1
_

-

1

e-r

=-

1+ e 1+ r

=

_

(1 + r)(1 + e)

-D
1+ r

Where the (-) sign indicates that funding has been reduced.

And similarly the risk-adjusted GenK disadvantage:
_

GenK disadvantage =

1+ e - r
_

_

-

1

=

1+ r

1+ e

( e - r)r
_

(1 + e )(1 + r )

=

rD
1+ r

which may be seen to represent the risk-free interest rate applied to the Gen1
advantage. In effect the windfall enjoyed by Gen1 constitutes an indebtedness upon
which all future generations pay the interest. A “final” generation would not be able to
discount its promise at any rate above the risk-free rate and thus it would have to pay
the principal as well as the interest on the Gen1 advantage:
GenΩ disadvantage =

1
1+ r

Result 5:

+ 1-

1+ r
_

1+ e

-

1

= D = GenK disadvantage – Gen1 advantage

1+ r

Spreading the economic component of actuarial gains and losses
over n future periods does not alter the results above except that
the first m generations may enjoy a diminishing windfall followed by
n-m generations who suffer an increasing burden. All generations
after the nth are identical but are heavily burdened.

Having seen that mutualization of risks and rewards over time does not provide relief
from the disadvantage bequeathed to future generations by Gen1, we ask whether
mutualizing the resulting gains and losses by spreading over time is efficacious. All
actuarial cost methods (ACMs) spread deviations from assumptions over varying
forward periods. Here we consider a simple generic spreading of each year’s net gain or
loss over subsequent periods in an overlapping fashion.

Consider first an example with gains and losses spread over two subsequent periods:
F1 = B
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F2 = B + D/2

FK = B + D/2 + (1 + r)D/2 = B +
Where :

D
s
2 2|

∀K > 2

(1 + r)n - 1
r

s n| =

Note that the expected return and the risk-free rate are assumed to be the same from
year to year13. Generalizing for the case where gains and losses are spread over n
subsequent periods and where J is a generation greater than 1 and less than n:
F1 = B
FJ = B +

D
s
n J|

∀J : 1 < J ≤ n

FK = B +

D
s
n n|

∀K > n

Since the cost of the windfall enjoyed by Gen1 is passed forward in stages, it will be the
case that several (m) generations will enjoy smaller net windfall s which will be followed
by a growing tab paid by the subsequent (n-m) generations rising to a maximum level
that remains the same for all generations beginning after GenN and prior to GenΩ. We
can solve for m:
B+

D
1
log(1 + nr + r)
s
=
⇒m=
-1
n m | 1+ r
log(1 + r)

For r = 5%, a 15-year spread (n=15) implies that m is 11.05 meaning that the first 11
generations (here taken as one year per generation) of taxpayers enjoy an advantage
while the next 5 generations are increasingly burdened to a maximum burden for Gen16
and beyond. For r = 5% with n=30, m=18.19. It is clear that intergenerational wealth
transfers must ultimately be exacerbated by the spreading of gains and losses over n
periods. However, the string of windfalls is long enough to warm the heart of politicians
and myopic taxpayers.

The GenK disadvantage may be reformulated:
rD

=D-

1+ r

13

D
1+ r

More complicated, but not necessarily more illuminative, models may be developed wherein
the expected value of e and the value of r vary over time
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The roll-up of additional interest added to the debt during the spreading period multiplies
the first term by:
s

n|
n

D
n|
n
1+ r

Ds

so that the GenK disadvantage becomes:

which means that the persisting disadvantage (for GenK, K>n) has been multiplied by:
(1+ r)s

n|
nr

-n

When r=5% and n=15, this means that the GenK disadvantage is multiplied by 10.21
and, when n=30, it is multiplied by 26.51.

Thus, spreading does not alleviate the

intergenerational transfers discussed above. Instead, it postpones the day of reckoning
and multiplies the disadvantage foisted upon future generations.

Note that these numeric results depend on the procedure for spreading gains and losses
over n periods. Above, the procedure assigns an increasing burden over time because
the amortizations “backload” the interest charges. A more typical flat-dollar amortization
might lead to somewhat smaller values of m and smaller final multipliers. The GASBacceptable approach, spreading over future payrolls might, however, raise these values.

Result 6:

The intergenerational wealth transfers detailed above do not result
from the equity investment or lack thereof but arise instead from the
actuarial use of an expected return in excess of the risk-free rate.

Reconsider Result 4 but assume that the base case funding is invested in the risky asset
allocation.

Gen1 no longer receives a windfall since the equity allocation and

subsequent risk do not reduce Gen1’s cost.

GenK faces an uncertain funding

requirement:
~

1
1+ r

+ 1-

1+ e
1+ r

~

=

1+ r - e
1+ r

Using the same risk adjustment as before, this may be replaced by a market-priced
certainty equivalent:
20
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~

1 + r - e risk adjusted
1+ r

→

1+ r - r
1+ r

=

1
1+ r

which is identical to the base case and thus implies no wealth transfer. In effect the risks
and rewards of each GenK are commensurate and each taxpayer may hedge to the riskfree base case cost.

IV

Implications

Magnitude
The Public Pension Coordinating Council's 2000 Survey of State and Local Retirement
Systems identifies a ratio of assets to liabilities for continuing respondents of 96%. The
survey estimates that it captures 77% of the $2.3 trillion of the assets reported by the
Federal Reserve Flow of Funds (1998). Assuming that the asset liability ratio is similar
for nonrespondents and respondents, we may estimate aggregate liabilities of $2.4
trillion. The survey interest rate has remained very close to 8% for the period 1992
through 1998. Because actuaries change the assumed discount rate slowly over time,
the magnitude of the generational bias varies primarily with the risk-free yield curve.

The duration of liabilities for seasoned defined benefit plans, with discount rates
approximating 8%, may confidently be bracketed by ten and fifteen years depending on
the relative weights of active and retired participants. The duration will be greater at
lower rates of interest and thus we can approximate the $2.4 trillion of liabilities may be
revalued at between $3 trillion and $3.2 trillion when the risk-free rate is 6% (circa 1999)
and between $$3.4 trillion and $3.8 trillion when the risk free rate is 5% (circa 1998).

Governmental accounting and funding for pension costs
Every governmental entity would like to get as much value out of each budget dollar as it
possibly can. Within the budgeting process, pensions are simply a cost and the smaller
the cost, the more satisfied are the financial managers of the entity.

To this end, financial managers other than actuaries will generally cajole actuaries
towards using ACM’s and actuarial assumptions that reduce current costs. Because the
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noneconomic assumptions are very much in the bailiwick of the actuaries and because
ACM’s are also an actuarial province, it is not surprising that the prime area for cajolery
is in the area of the economic assumptions (discount rate and salary scale).

The

financial managers may argue that they, not the actuary, know better the future
progression of employee wage increases. Further, because they control the investment
function and have a large say in setting the asset allocation, these managers may argue
that they should have great sway with respect to the assumed discount rate.
Actuaries, in general, consider themselves to be conservative14 with respect to pension
funding, and they believe that they will lean towards lower discount rates and higher
salary scales in order to mitigate the desires of the financial managers. Unfortunately,
actuaries believe that recognizing the risk premium before the risks have been realized
is not liberal15 and thus a “conservative” actuary may propose a discount rate that
reflects “only” 75% of the premium above the risk-free rate. The prescriptions of ASOP
27, FASB and GASB do not provide even the most conservative actuary the support (nor
an opportunity) to argue in favor of using the risk-free rate.

The use of an AAV in most funding methods makes actuaries vulnerable to a “short
straddle”16 in their efforts to resist the demands of financial managers. It is not unusual,
after a period in which asset returns have been better than expected, for the managers
to request that the actuary perform a “market value restart”17 in order to lower current
costs.

If the discount rate is unchanged, costs will be lowered.

Contrariwise, if

environmental interest rates rise – a situation often correlated with a decline in the ratio
of the AAV to market value – the request will come for an increased discount rate
assumption unaccompanied by a market value restart. Although GASB 25, paragraph
36c, may comfort the actuary who wishes to resist the whipsaw of this short straddle
position, the language is weak and the support fragile.

14
15
16

17

Trowbridge and Farr (1976) pp.27
Ibid.
A portfolio position characterized by short positions in both put and call options. In such a
situation, market movement in either direction is likely to result in an option being exercised.
In an insurance context, a similar situation is discussed and illustrated by Babbel (1994).
The AAV is reset to the current market value of assets and a new trailing average begins for
future AAV’s.
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Historically the equity exposure in public pension plans has lagged behind that in
corporate plans.

In the past two decades, however, while corporate plans have

maintained the equity levels reached during the 1970’s, public plans have moved to
narrow the gap. In effect, this means that the lesson of Result 2 has not been lost on
plan managers. Each increase in the equity exposure accompanied by a liberalization of
the assumed discount rate has provided a windfall. In several instances, elected officials
have initiated an increase in equity exposure and have then coerced actuarial
cooperation.

Benefit negotiations
“I would gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger, today.” Wimpy (Date unknown)

The public demand for openness that surrounds the activities of democratic
governments makes it necessary that the actuarial assumptions used to fund the plan
and to develop the sponsor’s financial statements must also be the assumptions that
rule the benefit negotiation process that takes place between the financial managers of
the governmental entity and its employees.

This means that these managers cannot retreat towards more conservative assumptions
when they sit across the bargaining table from the representatives of the employees. As
a result, public employee wages are decreased by relatively smaller amounts in
exchange for generous increases in pension benefits. The systematic underpricing of
the marginal cost of new benefits (Result 3) makes for bad bargains from the point of
view of taxpayers. It is often the opacity of the burden placed on future taxpayers that
makes both sides of the table happy with liberal actuarial assumptions.

As observed in the development of Result 3, a wage concession that is inadequate to
pay fully (i.e., without risk premium) for a new benefit has an impact far beyond the
initiating generation. Each new generation opens negotiations with the existing wage
and benefit package as a starting point.

Occasionally, such as in New York City during the late 1970’s and into the 1980’s, the
employee representatives will find themselves in a weak bargaining position. In such
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instances, whole waves of benefit escalation may be rescinded through the adoption of
less generous pension benefits for new hires. In accordance with the results presented
herein, this is a substantial reversal of fortune for the taxpayers since the underpricing
will also be present in this situation.

Skim funds
A common view held by professionals involved in the public plan sector is that the higher
expected returns on equities constitute a reward for their astuteness in recognizing that
they are “long-term investors.”

Because of their understanding that they are operating

in the fiduciary interests of the employees and because many of these plans include
mandatory employee contributions, they believe that the higher ex-post returns on
equities are a boon to be shared with employees.

It may be argued that potentially poor performance in equity returns constitutes a serious
threat to the benefits promised to employees. To the extent that this is true (i.e., that
taxpayers would not be called upon to make up the losses) the argument has merit. In
effect, this would be an argument for using a discount rate in excess of the risk-free rate
to reflect benefit insecurity when current pay is exchanged for promised benefits. To the
extent, however, that taxpayers will stand behind all promises in full measure, the
sharing of equity returns or any other asset results is unwarranted.

In recent periods, the returns to equity have been particularly rich and many defined
benefit pension plans of all sorts have enjoyed the resulting growth in asset value.
Public plan trustees often conclude that this wealth should be systematically shared
between taxpayers and employees.
“skim” fund18.

An invention to systematize the sharing is the

Retirement systems that adopt skim funds agree that “defined

19

contribution” companion plans will be attached to the existing defined benefit plans and
that when plan returns for one or more periods exceed an agreed upon benchmark rate,
a portion of the “excess” return will be skimmed off from the defined benefit plans and
will be placed in the companion plans. The assets of the companion plans will be used
to fund supplementary benefits on behalf of the participants of the main plans.
18

For an example of how such a fund might be “negotiated”, see Berry (1999).
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The rules for skimming can be quite complex and vary from plan to plan and from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Nonetheless several general observations may be made:
•

Skim plans constitute call options on the defined benefit plan assets written in favor
of the plan participants and at the expense of the taxpayer20. As a result, the net
_

expected return to the defined benefit plan will be less than e . When the skim takes
all the return in excess of a given return k, the net expected return is given by:
~

E[min( e, k)] = - (h(α )) 2 f(k, g(α ), h( α )) + g(α )F(k, g(α ), h( α )) + kF(-k, g(α ), h( α ))

where:

f is normal pdf (x,µ, s )
F is normal cdf (x,µ, s )
_

_

g( α ) = r + α(µ - r) = r + α(q - r) = e
h( α ) = σα

When the skim takes a fraction β ( 0 ≤ ß ≤ 1) of the return in excess of k:
~

E[return net of skim] = βE[min( e, k)] + (1 - β)g( α )

•

Once a skim plan is in effect, employee representatives on plan investment
committees have an incentive to push for ever higher equity exposure and asset
volatility since this will increase the value of the call options that have been granted.
This point may be subject to some mitigation when there is any sense that some
large amount of volatility may threaten benefit security.

•

Plan actuaries should value the skim fund benefits as options and increase plan
funding requirements accordingly. Most plan actuaries are not accustomed to using
the tools necessary for rigorous valuation and may use some “scenario” approaches
to estimation.

•

Once any skim fund is in effect, the taxpayers’ risk-adjusted optimal value for α is
zero. Without the skim, all asset allocations have the same risk-adjusted return,
equal to the risk-free rate. Any skim with a strictly positive probability of being in the
money must lower this rate. The only value of α that assures zero probability is zero.

19

20

The name is partly a misnomer. There are no individual accounts. These are better
understood to be supplement benefit plans where the inflow of funds is defined by the skim.
For a development of this in a Social Security context see Smetters (1999).
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It is ironic that the negotiating process often finds the employee representatives
demanding a skim fund in exchange for allowing the plan to increase α. This is
abetted by the municipal manager’s view that raising α constitutes a windfall, a view
that follows from the standard actuarial practice.
•

Once the skim plan is in effect there is an equity exposure (α value) that will
maximize the expected return to the plan net of the skim fund21. Any higher α value
will actually lower the expected net return. From that point onward, taxpayers will be
asked to bear increased risk and receive diminished expected returns.

Pension obligation bonds
Pension Obligation Bonds (POB’s) claim to be able to reduce the cash flow from a
municipality in support of its pension fund by taking advantage of the assumed discount
rate used by the plan’s actuary – an investment bank has described its POB proposal as
“arbitraging the actuary”.

Anand (2/3/97) refers to “the arbitrage between what Ms.

Whitman’s [New Jersey Governor Christine Todd Whitman] administration anticipates
paying bond purchasers and what it hopes to earn through the pension funds’
investments…”

The idea is for the municipality to borrow by issuing taxable POB’s (the IRS has ruled
_

POB’s cannot be tax-exempt) at its cost of borrowing, c, where r < c < e , and to place the
_

proceeds in the pension plan where the actuary will assume that they earn rate e .
Specifically, the proceeds “fund” a previously unfunded liability which was being
amortized as part of the plan’s annual cost.

Suppose an unfunded liability of $1 is being amortized over n periods in level dollar
amounts. The actuary would compute the amortization cost as:
_

1
_

a

21

n|

@e

e

=

_

1 - (1 + e ) -n

For values of β greater than some β* (where 0<β*<1), there will exist a finite value of α for
which the net expected return is maximized (although this value of α may exceed 100%). For
values of β<β*, the net expected return will be strictly increasing in α.
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The municipality issues an n-year POB with a $1 principal and a self-amortizing
repayment of:
1
a

n|

=

@c

c
1 - (1 + c) -n

The $1 proceeds of the issue are placed in the plan to “satisfy” the previously unfunded
liability and invested in accordance with the α-based asset mix assumed in Section III.
The actuary eliminates the amortization charge from the current cost. The municipality
now pays the debt service instead of the amortization charge, a “saving” to the
municipality of:
_

e
_

1 - (1 + e )

c

-n

1 - (1 + c )

>0
-n

Note that when n = 1, we have a case as simple as in Section III above and the above
_

reduces to: e - c > 0 .

The process outlined may be divided into two processes which, taken together, have the
identical financial substance as the original process:
•

The pension plan locates within its portfolio a subportfolio of Treasury securities with
a market value of $1 and with cash flows exactly proportionate to the amortization
schedule of the proposed POB’s22. It sells this portfolio and invests the proceeds in
the α-based asset mix.

•

The municipality issues the POB’s and places the $1 proceeds in the pension fund
where the $1 is used to repurchase the Treasury subportfolio sold above.

This deconstruction shows that the first step is a swap or an asset reallocation whose
risk-adjusted value is zero. This is as simple as the recognition that $1 in bonds has the
same value as $1 in stocks.

Their divergent expected future values are exact

compensation for their differential risk. The second step constitutes a borrowing by the
municipality at its borrowing rate, c, for the purpose of investing in Treasury securities
22

If, as is likely, such bonds cannot be found, many equivalent alternatives can be constructed
using swaps or futures contracts. The important point here is that a large, liquid pension fund
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with a rate r. With c>r, the differential periodic cash flow equals

c(1 + c)n

-

r(1 + r)n

(1 + c) n - 1 (1 + r)n - 1

>0

which equals c-r for n=1 and for very large values of n and is somewhat less for
intermediate n.

The two steps taken together make it clear that the POB process

amounts to an asset reallocation that could be done independently of the bond issuance
coupled with a borrowing at rate c in order to invest at rate r.

The market assigns the higher borrowing rate, c, to the municipal debt because holders
of this debt face a greater risk of default or “a debt-service moratorium”23 than do holders
of Treasury debt. There are two ways to look at the debt-for-debt transaction:
•

If the municipality deems its promise to the pension plan to be without risk to the plan
(clearly a view somewhat at odds with the market debt rate assignments), then the
transaction is simply a money loser.

•

If the municipality agrees with the market that its promise is not as good as the
Treasury promise, then the debt-for-debt transaction amounts to a defeasance24 in
favor of the plan and its participants and the net cost of the defeasance, (c-r)
annually, is an additional benefit to plan participants paid for by the taxpayers.

Note that, if the municipality could issue tax-exempt POB’s at a rate c’ < r, then a true
arbitrage could be effected. It is just this reasoning that led the IRS to rule that POB’s
are taxable bonds.

In an unsigned editorial, Pensions and Investments (3/3/97), warns: “Gov. Christine
Todd Whitman’s plan to issue $2.9 billion in pension obligation bonds is good news for
participants…. The state, and taxpayers should view the pension obligation bonds more
cautiously…”

Earlier in the decade Los Angeles County debated the merits of POB’s. During the
debate the actuarial rate remained unchanged. As the rates that would be required to

23

with substantially deferred cash outflows can effectively borrow at or near the Treasury
borrowing rate.
Mid-1970’s euphemism for default adopted by New York City.
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sell the POB’s rose, the proponents argued that the delays were costly to the county. “In
October 1992, issuing the pension obligation bonds would have saved the county an
estimated $519 million [over twenty years]. By February 25 of this [1994] year, interest
rate increases shrunk potential savings to $318 million. By March 10, higher interest
rates had reduced the estimated savings to $240 million, according to [a plan trustee].”
Hemmerick (4/18/94). This article exposes many of the political consequences arising
from the use of an actuarial discount rate that is not risk-adjusted.

A continuation,

Hemmerick (7/25/94), shows the county bargaining position weakening through the
delay and the trustees demanding additional concessions from the county.

In an exchange of Commentary (Surz, 4/4/94) and Letters (Stoufer, 5/30/94, Surz,
6/13/94), Mr. Surz, with a technical error later corrected by Mr. Stoufer, gets the
substantive issues correct and concludes: “My basic premise still stands. POB’s are
advocated by those who benefit from them – underwriters, investment managers,
consultants and beneficiaries.

From whence does this benefit derive?

It’s paid by

taxpayers, who clearly lose as they are bilked into buying off on bogus arbitrage
arguments.”

Writing in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 1/18/98, Brian O’Neill writes: “I'm asking [a friend
who knows about high-finance] about the city selling $250 million in bonds to bail out its
pension fund, asking if it's a good idea for taxpayers, when he offers eight words of
solace I'll never forget: ‘If we're really stupid, we're not uniquely stupid.’" An internet
search indicates recent POB activities in Massachusetts, Connecticut and Georgia along
with an unending river of POB’s in California.

There is a simpler burlesque of the POB phenomenon that contains all the financial
substance of the claimed POB advantages:

Suppose a state government issues $1 billion of 30-year bonds promising
to pay 6% interest and then takes $500 million of the proceeds and puts it
into an account where it is invested in equities. Since the expected return
on the $500 million of equities is sufficiently high to meet all of the bond
payments, the state spends the remaining $500 million immediately as it
24

A special case of collateralization using Treasury securities; may be accompanied by
accounting derecognition of the debt so collateralized.
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pleases. An actuary says he believes that the assets are sufficient to
meet the liabilities and cites ASOP 27 in support of his position.
The fundamental point of this section is this: the persistent use of expected returns in
actuarial models involving risky assets ignores all of the financial economics of the last
40 years and exposes taxpayers to manipulations by those who are more sophisticated
about securities markets.

V

Counter-Arguments

The arguments and model of this paper may be familiar to financial economists but they
represent a significant departure from the precepts of pension actuarial science. This
section raises some counter-arguments from an actuarial point of view. Some of the
counter arguments may be refutable from the point of view of the financial economists.
Others of the arguments are not refutable and may point to areas that merit further study
and consideration.

Actuaries may ask whether a refutation based in financial economics should carry any
persuasive power into the actuarial discipline. The author believes that two aspects of
the argument at hand bring weight to the lessons of financial economics:
•

The issue argued in this paper is the setting of a discount rate assumption that varies
with the anticipated asset allocation and whether or not this introduces biases into
what has previously been thought to be a generationally unbiased process. This is
an issue close to the center of financial economics and thus the lessons of financial
economics should be carefully considered by actuaries.

•

No theory is ever really proven.

Science depends, however, on the concept of

falsifiability. Because a theory that is falsifiable may be refuted, a falsifiable theory
that is repeatedly tested and is not refuted gains credibility over time. Theories in
financial economics are tested in the securities markets every day. Many theories
about market behavior have been presented over the past forty years. Few remain
standing after being tested in this day-by-day-by-day manner. One still standing is
the theory that identical cash flows must carry the same market price.

It is

sometimes called “no-arbitrage pricing” or the “law of one price” (Panjer, 1998) and
sometimes it is said that a security has been “priced by arbitrage” (Huang and
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Litzenberger, 1988). In contrast, science must remain cautious about a process
such as pension valuation where thirty-year estimates are updated by new thirty-year
estimates each year. It is not that the self-correcting nature of such a process is not
practical, nor is it the case that the self-correction will necessarily break down.
Because the process is self-correcting, however, none of the estimates are truly
falsifiable. Thus, the scientific concern must be whether the year-by-year estimates
can be treated as verifiable and meaningful reflections of financial reality.

Expected costs will decline over time
If defined benefit plan valuations are performed using the risk-free discount rate and the
plan invests in equities, the expected plan costs will decline over time approaching the
lowest level for generations n+1 and thereafter. In the model of this paper, there will be
a decline in dollars/taxpayer. In typical applications, the decline will be in the cost as a
percentage of payroll. This may be disturbing to actuaries because most ACM’s are
designed to create level expected costs across generations of taxpayers.

This is not a flaw in the risk-adjusted model. It is a difference in philosophy. The
traditional actuarial methods favor level costs over time, deeming this to be a proper
measure of intergenerational equity. A risk-adjusted model emphasizes unbiased riskadjusted costs over time and declares this to be the measure of intergenerational equity.
So why choose one or the other?

Because the risk-adjusted model allows each

generation to face the same ex-ante burden whereas the expected-return model
provides an ex-ante reward to Gen1 that no other generation can match.

If the plan chooses not to invest in equities and uses the risk-free rate, both level
expected costs and level risk-adjusted costs (and thus, intergenerational equity) will be
achieved and taxpayers will hold their desired amount of risky assets in private
portfolios. If the plan chooses to invest in equities and uses the risk-free rate, level riskadjusted costs will be achieved and taxpayers may reduce their private equity exposure
relative to the prior case. In this latter circumstance, taxpayers will have lower private
expected wealth (ex ante, identical risk-adjusted expected wealth) offset by lower
expected pension costs.

31

Jeremy Gold

Assumed Rates of Discount for Valuations September 22, 2000
of Publicly Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans

In more direct terms, it is equitable for expected costs to decline from higher levels for
early generations who do not bear the equity risk to lower levels for those later
generations that do.

The use of a salary scale overstates current costs and offsets
understatements due to the expected-return model
This contention may well be true. Its veracity depends on a view about whether the
liabilities for pensions based on future pay increases emerge when the employee
provides a current year of service or when the future pay increase is realized. This
paper does not take a position with respect to these varying views.

On the one hand, this paper argues that the use of expected returns on equities
constitutes a wealth transfer among generations. On the other hand, it is not really the
direction or magnitude of the transfer that is central to the argument. The use of the
expected return is systematically biased. The fact that any other assumption or element
of actuarial methodology, or any combinations thereof, may be systematically biased in
such a way as to offset the expected return bias does not contradict the central
argument.

A related issue follows.

The actuarial process uses many assumptions and each represents the
center of a distribution of possible outcomes. What is different about the
assumed discount rate that makes its use biased and these other estimates
unbiased?
We might have begun the discussion of the discount rate bias with a review of utility
functions and risk aversion and, in that context, might have asked whether a risk-averse
~

agent would prefer to receive a sure return of r or an unsure return of e . We would have
concluded that, with liquid and accessible markets, a representative risk-averse agent
would be indifferent.

Consider uncertainty about mortality rates. Among 1000 men aged 65 we might expect
there to be 15 deaths in one year.

A risk-averse agent would prefer to exchange this

uncertainty for a certainty of 15 deaths or maybe even 14 (here fewer deaths are less
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“desirable” because the agent is responsible for an annuity).
mortality assumptions also need to be risk-adjusted?

Does this imply that

If not, what is the difference

between uncertain mortality and uncertain asset returns?

First, we assume that there is no significant covariance between discount and mortality
rates; later, we return to the case where some uncertain liability parameters (e.g.,
inflation) do correlate with discount rates and asset values. Additionally we will assume
that our uncertainty about mortality is limited to the realization (i.e., we believe that we
have correctly estimated the distribution parameters); again, we will return to consider
how misestimates of the distribution compare to the discount rate case.

The most significant distinction between discount rate and mortality uncertainty is this:
we can, calling upon the Law of Large Numbers, diversify the mortality risk. If the
population of the pension plan is small, the sponsor may find that it makes sense to use
insurance (and the insurer may similarly use reinsurance) to achieve the necessary
diversification.

Note that, although there are friction costs entailed, there is no

theoretical limit to the efficiency of the insurance/reinsurance process.

What about

diversifying the equity risk? Idiosyncratic equity risk is diversifiable in much the same
way as is the mortality risk (more efficiently, perhaps). Systemic risk, however, is not
and modern finance teaches that the equity risk premium is a direct consequence of the
nondiversifiability of systemic risk. None of the equity premium constitutes any reward
for bearing idiosyncratic risk.

What about errors in the estimation of the distribution parameters for mortality? Does
this not constitute a risk that cannot be diversified? Yes, and perhaps this justifies some
actuarial conservatism in projecting mortality rates. This, however, is not analogous to
the systemic risk of equities.

It is, rather, analogous to the misestimation of the

parameters of the equity distribution. Perhaps the equity premium should be estimated
as 5% rather than 6% or vice versa. The unique quality about systemic risk is that it
persists even if the parameters are perfectly estimated and even after the most diligent
efforts to diversify.

What about those parameters that do correlate with capital markets instruments?
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Over long periods of time, inflation and salaries and thus liabilities are
correlated with equity performance. Doesn’t this mean that equities are
less risky to a pension plan than to other investors?
To the extent that the premise is true, the arguments of this paper need to be modified.
Here we address two issues: First, what is the relationship between defined benefit
pension liabilities and factors found in the capital markets in places other than the yield
curve? Second, what modification needs to be made to the general case presented in
this paper?

This paper presumes that pension promises may be reasonably presented as fixed
income streams. This is not entirely realistic, but it is a starting place. It can easily be
extended to the case where post-employment COLA’s are included in the defined benefit
by reference to the relatively new CPI-indexed Treasury bonds.

The broader, and weaker, correlations between pension liabilities and other economic
factors (various measures of inflation versus salaries, economic growth versus service
termination and disability rates, productivity gains versus real salary growth) and how the
equity markets react to these same factors is largely an empirical issue and beyond the
scope of this paper. Nonetheless, where significant correlations may be found between
the liabilities and market instruments (e.g., equities), the model herein must be modified.

Consider the case where there is a portfolio of liquid assets that perfectly tracks the
liabilities of a pension plan. This portfolio may be dubbed the “liability asset”. For
defined benefit pension plans, the existence of such an asset might be implausible, but
one can imagine a liability constructed to match available market assets. In fact this is
done in many cash balance plans (Gold, 1999). Because the price of a liquid portfolio
may easily and frequently be obtained, we should expect that the expected return and
volatility of this portfolio may be readily estimated. In the case where the perfect liability
asset exists, the model in this paper should be modified to use the expected return on
this portfolio for the value of r. When, as is usually the case, there is no liability asset but
there are credible correlations between equities and liabilities, the value of r should also
be modified.
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Consider the case where the liability-beta is β L (assumed >0, but the algebraic
implications survive if ßL ≤ 0 ) and there are no other non-fixed-income factors in the
securities market that correlate with the liabilities. This means that there is a promise
~

_

~

with a present value given by L and a next period value of P such that P = E[P] = 1 and
~

that P has the same distribution that would be obtained if (1 - ßL )L were invested at the
~

risk-free rate and ßL L were invested in q . Thus we derive:
~

~

(1 - ßL )L(1 + r) + ßL L(1 + q) = P
~

~

E[(1 - ßL )L(1 + r) + ßL L(1 + q)] = E[P] = 1

1

L=

1 + r'
_

where r' = r + ßL (q - r)

We assume the base case with the pension assets invested in the risk-free asset and no
wealth transfers among generations. We subsequently learn that the liabilities are not
riskless but that βL applies. Now each generation is made richer by:
1

-

1

1+ r 1+ r'

The taxpayer who wishes to maintain her equity exposure sets aside

1

in a β L-

1 + r'

portfolio instead of

1

in a risk-free investment. Equivalently, she takes an amount

1+ r

equal to

ßL

~

out of her risk-free account and invests it in q . The end result, compared

1 + r'

to the base case is a distribution of wealth around a richer expectation with the same
uncertainty as the original wealth distribution.

This result is not surprising. On a relative basis, taxpayers are richer because they have
given employees a risky promise with an expected value of 1 instead of a risk-free
promise of 1.

The taxpayers’ risk-adjusted gain is identical to the employees’ risk-

adjusted loss.
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Mean reversion
“Any market downswing experienced in one generation will be offset by an upswing in
later generations.” (Burrows, 1999)

The view above was presented by the Interim Director of the Actuarial Standards Board,
Edward Burrows, in a fashion that suggests that he would expect general concurrence
from his pension-actuarial audience. It is likely that he and his audience would expect
the burden of proof of any contrary point of view to fall upon the expresser of the
contrary opinion. Implicit in the view of most pension actuaries is a mean-reverting
model of stock returns over time. The issue of whether or not stock returns exhibit
mean-reverting behavior and, if so, over what periods of time, is beyond the scope of
this paper.

This paper presumes a model of stock returns that is neither mean-reverting nor trendfollowing. While this model may not be an entirely necessary presumption, it is clear that
one can construct mean-reverting models of stock market behavior that would not allow
the arguments made herein.

The uncertainty that is inherent in all the actuarial assumptions other than
the discount rate creates a “noisy” process. Under such circumstances, it
is best to aim at the center (or slightly to the conservative side) of all the
parameters taken together.
This argument is a generalization and compounding of two counter arguments above:
the offsetting-assumptions argument, and the argument that equity returns are as
averageable as mortality rates.

Result 4 is based upon a stationary population where the gains and losses
of one generation are borne by an equal size following generation. What if
growth of the population and/or general inflation allows the gains or losses
to be spread over ever-larger forward generations?
Define:

f ≡ periodic rate of general inflation
p ≡ periodic rate of population growth
g ≡ (1 + f)(1 + p) - 1
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_

FK =

e-r
1+
1+ g
_

1+ e

For this risk-adjusted FK to be no greater than

1
, it is necessary and sufficient that
1+ r

g ≥ r . Since the risk-free rate is nominal, g is greater than f (real rate strictly positive)

and thus p must be strictly greater than zero. This means that the population must be
ever-increasing in order for each generation to be able to enjoy a risk and growth
adjusted windfall. When the population growth rate falls below the risk-free real rate,
i.e., p <

1+ r
- 1 , these Malthusian chickens come home to roost.
1+ f

Even when we acknowledge that Malthus is not the final word when it comes to
predicting the dangers in growth, it is still difficult to justify methodologies that transfer
wealth forward and risk backward along the generation stream.

Actuarial precepts require that ACM’s and assumptions remain robust in the face of
populations that are winding down.

This means that we do not expect a vigorous

defense of existing methods and assumptions based on the growth forever premise.
The recent baby-buster generation in the U.S. represents an example of the weakness
in any such growth arguments. There is some irony in the observation that proponents
of equity investments in the Social Security system point to public plans as their model at
the time that intergenerational difficulties in the Social Security system have been
highlighted by the existence of the busters.

VI

Extensions

Corporate Pension Plans
This paper addresses public sector pension plans, concluding that the recognition of
equity premia in the discount rate leads to intergenerational wealth transfers.

The

analysis may be extended into the area of single-employer pension plans sponsored by
publicly traded corporations. In order to apply our arguments, we have to substitute
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shareholders for taxpayers and corporations for governmental agencies. In this sector,
we must make more distinctions and conclusions must be more narrowly drawn.

This paper has been able to ignore the tax-favored status enjoyed by pension trust funds
primarily because public plan sponsors are generally tax exempt. In the private sector,
the tax status of plans and sponsors moves close to center stage. Black (1981) and
Tepper (1981) have used arbitrage arguments to question private plan investments in
equities which already enjoy partial tax deferral in contrast to fixed income investments.

ASOP 27 applies to both public and private defined benefit pension plans.

ERISA

defines the minimum funding standards and maximum tax deductions for employer cash
contributions. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insures qualified private plans
when the sponsor is unable to meet its obligations. FAS 87 directs the plan sponsor’s
accounting for its defined benefit pension plans.

Trowbridge and Farr (1976) state that the flow of employer contributions into its pension
plan serves two primary purposes:
•

Budgeting of employer pension costs

•

Securing employee pensions25

Because the PBGC is a guarantor of much of the benefits promised to employees,
Sharpe (1976) observes that the level and allocation of plan assets may be used to
determine (and manage) the value of the “PBGC put”. Since 1976, the PBGC has
successfully lobbied Congress to increase the effective minimum funding standards and
to narrow the circumstances under which the put may be exercised.

Additional

refinements to ERISA have narrowed the window of possible tax deductions by
specifying certain discount rates to be used in the funding process. A model of the
interactions between the funding rules, cash contributions, asset allocation and PBGC
insurance and their impact on the benefit values from the employee and stockholder
perspectives should be a worthy subject for additional research.

25

Trowbridge and Farr (1976), pp. 4-5
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The themes of this paper have applicability in the area of corporate accounting for
defined benefit plans under the rules of FAS 87, briefly outlined in Appendix B. The
arguments apply to the expected long-term returns on assets as defined by FAS 87.
The definition is consistent with the ASOP 27 definition of discount rates/investment
returns and is inclusive of anticipated risk premia. Thus a corporation that intends to
invest more heavily in equities uses a higher long-term expected return, immediately
reducing pension expense and raising reported earnings. As before, we find that an
advantage (higher earnings) has been frontloaded and risks have been passed on to
later accounting periods. This implicit violation of the matching principle of accounting
closely parallels the wealth transfer issues in the public sector.

Whether or not this leads to an actual wealth transfer turns on the transparency of the
accounting presentation of the status of the pension plan. If securities analysts are able
to deduce from the disclosures that the returns are unmatched to the risk bearing, they
can make adjustments (in, e.g., the price-earnings ratio). Note that it is easier to sell a
security than it is to sever the relationship between a taxpayer and government.

To the extent that translucency or opacity better describes the view of the analyst, then
FAS 87, by paralleling the ASOP 27 rules with respect to risk premia, can lead to
transfers of wealth and risk between generations of shareholders. (Gold, 1989)

The Virtues of Smoothing
This paper is not sympathetic to the priority that various actuarial processes assign to
the smooth development of pension plan costs. The high priority given to solving the
sponsor’s budgeting (or reporting) problem does not comport well with the financial
realities of pension plans viewed as financial institutions.

The numbered results imply that smoothing is a one way street. It is not possible to take
the risks realized in GenK and spread them backwards to earlier generations. As result
the biases that arise from incorporating risk premia into discount rates are exacerbated
by the smoothing process.
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It is not necessarily the case that unbiased actuarial assumptions will lead to erratic cost
development. Once the illusion that equity investments create a windfall is disposed of,
plans can achieve reasonably smooth results by investing in liability-matching assets.

It remains to be investigated whether smoothing risky results forward in time can serve a
purpose when there is no primary bias to exacerbate.

VII

Conclusions

The actuarial assumption of discount rates that include equity risk premia is biased in
favor of early generations and against later generations. This bias is not mitigated by
various actuarial smoothing techniques. The use of expected returns is embedded in
the actuarial psyche, where it flows somewhat naturally from seemingly similar treatment
applied to such actuarial assumptions as mortality rates.

The actuaries who developed the current methods and assumptions did so at the same
time that financial economics was developing an important distinction between market
and nonmarket risks. Financial economics teaches that systemic market risks cannot be
diversified and that this is the source of the equity risk premium. While a mean-reverting
model is not explicitly argued in the actuarial literature, such a view has informed much
of the thinking of actuaries practicing today. The Burrows quote at the beginning of the
mean reversion subsection of the counter arguments (and its general acceptance by
pension actuaries) illustrates this. If, in fact, a strong mean reversion exists in the equity
markets, then the pension actuary is correct. But then, the burlesque version of pension
obligation bonds is likely to prevail and government can become a perpetual money
machine by borrowing to invest in equities to earn risk premia. Proponents of equity
investments in the Social Security system may be engaging in the same burlesque.

We have seen that a perpetual growth scenario may also be used to postpone the
intergenerational bias that arises from the unfortunate actuarial prescription for the
assumed discount rate. This argument will not generally flow from actuaries, who have
been trained to resist it, but it may have served to camouflage the actuarial bias to date.
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Actuaries being trained today are receiving a mixed message. In their pension studies,
they learn that “the present value of future contingent payments is a function of the rate
of investment return, or interest at which the payments are discounted. … The rate
should represent the expected rate of return on plan assets over the long term.”26 In
their investment studies they are exposed to financial economics in a much more
rigorous fashion than were their predecessors (Panjer, 1998). The dissonance between
these has not received much attention to date and that inattention motivates this paper.

While the flaws in ASOP 27 and its predecessors may, at some future date, be
addressed by actuaries better schooled in modern finance, the use of expected returns
on plan assets has, over the last four decades, been implanted in statute, regulation and
the practices of the accounting profession.

The implications that derive from the bias-inducing actuarially assumed discount rate
should be as troubling for taxpayers and policymakers as the design flaw should be for
actuaries trained in financial economics. The systematic underpricing of benefits that
appeals to municipal managers at budget time has done substantial damage to these
budgets in the long run because benefit improvements are negotiated and priced using
the same optimism. Undervalued options, such as that exemplified by skim funds, and
the highly dubious "arbitrage [of] the actuary” that leads to POB’s, injure taxpayers.

Any generation of taxpayers that acts to reduce the equity premium in its actuarial rate
must injure itself by paying for the sins of its predecessors while protecting future
generations.

I.e., such a generation volunteers to become GenΩ.

If, however, no

generation so acts, the taxpayers will continue to be shorn for the benefit of others.
Because recent equity returns have been well above historic norms, it may be argued
that this generation can better afford to clean the slate than most.

Practically, the

incorporation of equity premia in assumed rates of return could be phased out over a
period of time so that the situation is corrected without one generation alone having to
bear the GenΩ burden.

26

McGill et al (1996), pp. 515
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In the private sector, financial analysts should be concerned with the earnings reported
under FAS 87 and with the availability of the information necessary to make their own
analytical adjustments.
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Appendices

A

Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 27, Selection of
Economic Assumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations

Adopted by the ASB in December, 1996, ASOP 27 supercedes ASOP 4 with respect to
economic assumptions.

Generally, economic assumptions include discount rates,

investment returns, inflation, compensation scales and related factors. They may be
distinguished from noneconomic (demographic) assumptions relating to rates of death,
disability, termination of employment, retirement, marriage, etc.

For the purposes of this paper, Section 3.6 Selecting an Investment Return Assumption
and a Discount Rate is most relevant. Sections 3.5 Selecting an Inflation Assumption
and Section 3.7 Selecting a Compensation Scale are pertinent to Section V Counter
Arguments.

Section 3.6 states in part that “The discount rate is used to determine the present value
of expected future plan payments. Generally, the appropriate discount rate is the same
as the investment return assumption. But for some purposes, such as SFAS 87 [herein
FAS 87] or unfunded plan valuations, the discount rate may be selected independently
of the plan’s investment return assumption, if any.”

Section 3.62 Constructing the Investment Return Range details two example methods:

a.

Building-Block Method – after identifying asset classes and, for each such class,
estimating real returns and inflation, “compute an average, weighted real-return
range reflecting the plan’s expected asset class mix; and … combine [this] …
with the expected inflation range.”

b.

Cash Flow Matching Method – “Under the cash flow matching method, the
expected future investment return range is viewed as the combination of (i) the
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internal rate of return on a bond portfolio [of noncallable, high-quality corporate or
U.S. government bonds] with interest and principal payments approximately
matching the plan’s expected disbursements, and (ii) a risk adjustment range.”
The risk adjustment range should reflect “expected future plan investments in
equities or other asset classes besides high-quality bonds.”

Clearly, the prescription given by ASOP 27 is that the equity premium (or other risk
premia) is to be included in the discount rate when the plan is anticipated to invest in
equities and other risky assets. In the present environment, the equity risk premium
amounts to several percent per annum and equity allocations frequently represent a
majority or near majority of plan assets. Thus, for such plans today, ASOP 27 holds that
use of the risk-free rate is outside of the actuarial standard of practice.

B

Statement No. 87 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FAS 87), Accounting for Pensions by Employers

FAS 87 provides the standards of accounting for private employers who sponsor defined
benefit pension plans. The priority of pension accounting is to recognize pension cost
over the service period of each employee covered by the plan. This objective leads, in
part, to the choice of an accrued benefit actuarial cost method since such methods do
not spread costs over aggregations of employees. The chosen method is a modification
of an earlier actuarial method often identified as Projected Unit Credit (PUC).

The Projected Unit Credit method assigns to each year of service for each employee a
pro rata share of the benefit that will have been earned upon separation from service,
reflecting an estimate of any past or future wages that may be taken into account by the
defined benefit formula. If, for example, an actuary assumes that an employee, hired at
age 35 will retire at age 65 and will have a pay history at age 65 that entitles him to an
annual retirement benefit of $30,000, the method will dictate that $1000 of that benefit be
allocated to each of the thirty years of service.

If that employee is now 50 years of age, the method will recognize $15,000 of the
projected $30,000 benefit as having been accrued to date and will recognize an
additional $1000 to be earned in the current accounting year. The $15,000 benefit,
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multiplied by an appropriate annuity factor and discounted for the period prior to the
commencement of the benefit, becomes the Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO)
attributable to this employee. The PBO for the plan will be the sum for all current
participants of the plan including the remaining annuity value for all those no longer
actively employed. The $1000 of benefit to be allocated to the current period will also be
multiplied and discounted by the same factors. The resulting value is called the Service
Cost (SC) for this employee and will be aggregated across employees to yield the plan’s
Service Cost for this period. Using the language of traditional actuarial writings, the PBO
would be called the Accrued Liability under the PUC method. The SC would be called
the Normal Cost (NC) under the PUC method.

Under the traditional PUC method, the annual cost for the plan would then be
determined as:

NC + Amortizat ions , where the amortizations would be a periodic

payment whose present value would equal the difference: PBO - AAV which would be
called the Unfunded Accrued Liability. The amortization amount for the current period
would depend upon the history of events that created the divergence between the AAV
and the PBO. Such items as an existing difference at the commencement of the plan, or
a difference created by changes to the benefit formula of the plan or to changes in
actuarial assumptions, or to differences over time between actual and assumed
experience (actuarial gain or loss) would be amortized over various fixed periods.

FAS 87 modifies this method in several ways:
•

The amortizations in the traditional method include interest on the unfunded accrued
liability in each amortization element. FAS 87 separates the interest component and
applies it to the PBO and the AAV (renamed the Market-Related-Value, MRV)
separately. The unfunded accrued liability arising from the initial application of FAS
87 and any changes therein attributable to changes in the plan formula or actuarial
assumptions are spread (amortized) over time without interest. The gain or loss is
accumulated (the asset component of gain and loss is only included herein after it
has entered into the MRV) and when it is sufficiently large (it exceeds a optional
buffer zone known as a “corridor”) it is spread over time without interest.
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The interest component applied to the PBO is computed using a discount rate
identified as the “settlement rate”. This same rate, designated i below is also used to
compute the PBO itself and the SC. It is determined at each valuation date based on
the returns available on high-quality fixed income securities or annuities. In the
sense that it contains no equity risk premium and does not take the plan’s asset
allocation into account, it is conceptually similar to the risk-free rate used elsewhere
in this paper. ASOP 27 identifies this as a “prescribed rate” and exempts it from the
general ASOP 27 rules pertaining to the selection of an investment return range.

•

The interest component applied to the MRV is computed using an expected longterm rate of return on plan assets that is consistent with the ASOP 27 rules. This
rate designated j below is generally left unchanged for several years.

The PUC formula may then be reconstituted as: iPBO + SC + Amortizat ions - jMRV .
Herein, amortizations are without interest. Amortization of accumulated gains or losses
only considers such gains or losses outside of the corridor. The asset component of
gains and losses only recognizes the difference in actual versus expected return to the
extent that the difference has been filtered through the averaging process used to
develop the MRV. As in most ACM’s, the special treatment of the divergence between
asset assumptions and experience amounts to an extra degree of smoothing.

C

Statement

No.

25

of

the

Governmental

Accounting

Standards Board (GASB 25), Financial Reporting for
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note Disclosures for
Defined Contribution Plans
This statement outlines the standard methods and provides guidance with respect to
assumptions used by actuaries and accountants in the preparation of financial reports
for public (governmental) employee pension plans. Of most interest with respect to the
subject of this paper is Paragraph 36, subparagraphs b-f.
•

Subparagraph b provides linkage to ASOP 4 and its successors including ASOP 27
which is a successor to parts of ASOP 4.

•

Subparagraph c says, in part, “the investment return assumption (discount rate)
should be based on an estimated long-term investment yield for the plan with
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consideration given to the nature and mix of current and expected plan investments
and the basis used to determine the actuarial value of assets (paragraph 36e).”
•

Subparagraph d names acceptable actuarial cost methods including “entry age,
frozen entry age, attained age, frozen attained age, projected unit credit, or the
aggregate actuarial cost method…”

•

Subparagraph e describes Actuarial Asset Value methodology and indicates that it
is to be market related.

•

Subparagraph f details amortizations required for use with some of the actuarial cost
methods. amortizations may be made as fixed dollars over periods ranging from 10
to 40 years or as a percentage of the projected payroll of active plan members..

Bolding above follows that of the document and highlights defined terms. Paragraph 45
indicates that the various actuarial cost methods (ACMs) are as defined in ASOP 4.

D

Statement

No.

27

of

the

Governmental

Accounting

Standards Board (GASB 27), Accounting for Pensions by
State and Local Government Employers
This document is the companion to GASB 25 prescribing the inclusion of pension-related
financial information on the books of account of the employing entities.

47

Jeremy Gold

Assumed Rates of Discount for Valuations September 22, 2000
of Publicly Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans

References
Accounting Principals Board Opinion No. 8, “Accounting for The Cost of Pension Plans”,
1966
Actuarial Standards Board, Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 4, “Measuring Pension
Obligations”, 1993
Actuarial Standards Board, Actuarial Standard of Practice No. 27, “Selection of
Economic Assumptions for Measuring Pension Obligations”, December 1996
Anand, V., “Pension Bonds to Help N.J”, Pensions and Investments, 2/3/97
Babbel, D. F., “A Perspective on Model Investment Laws for Insurers”, “Journal of the
American Society of CLU and ChFC, September 1994, pp. 72-77
Barry, D., “Behind Pension Raise, Union’s Aggressive Courtship of City Council”, New
York Times, 5-9-99
Burrows, E. E., “A Cash Balance Solution for Social Security”, Enrolled Actuaries Report,
May 1999
Berin, B. B., “The Fundamentals of Pension Mathematics”, Society of Actuaries, 1976
Black, F., “The Tax Consequences of Long-Run Pension Policy“, Financial Analysts
Journal, July-August 1981, pp. 21-28
Dreher, W. A., “Gain and Loss Analysis for Pension Fund Valuations”, Transactions of
the Society of Actuaries (TSA) No. 11 (1960), pp. 588-635
Editorial (Unsigned), “A Pension Arbitrage”, Pensions and Investments, 3/3/97
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting Standard No. 35,
“Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans”, March 1980
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting Standard No. 36,
“Disclosure of Pension Information”, May 1980
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting Standard No. 87,
“Employers’ Accounting for Pensions”, December 1985
Gold, J., “Indebtedness as a Model for Deferred Liability Accounting”, Comments to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1989
Gold, J., “The Shareholder-Optimal Design of Cash Balance Pension Plans”, Working
Paper, 1999

48

Jeremy Gold

Assumed Rates of Discount for Valuations September 22, 2000
of Publicly Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans

Governmental Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 25, “Financial Reporting for
Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans”,
Nov. 1994
Governmental Accounting Standards Board, Statement No. 27, “Accounting for
Pensions by State and Local Governmental Employers”, Nov. 1994
Federal Reserve, "Flow of Funds Account of the United States", 2nd Quarter 1998
Hamilton, J. A., and Jackson, P. H., “The Valuation of Pension Fund Assets”, TSA No.
20 (1968), pp. 386-417
Harrison, J.M., and Kreps, D. M., “Martingales and Arbitrage in Multiperiod Securities
Markets”, Journal of Economic Theory 20, 1979, p. 389
Hemmerick, S., “Los Angeles Bond Offering Likely to be Dead”, Pensions and
Investments, 4/18/94
Hemmerick, S., “L. A. County Eyes Bonds”, Pensions and Investments, 7/25/94
Huang, C., and Litzenberger, R. H., “Foundations for Financial Economics”, PrenticeHall, 1988
McGill, D. M., Brown, K. N., Haley, J. J. & Schieber, S. J., “Fundamentals of Private
Pensions, Seventh Edition”, Pension Research Council, The Wharton School of the
University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996
Modigliani, F., and Miller, M., “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory
of Investment”, American Economic Review 48, 1958, pp. 261-297
O’Neill, B., Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 1/18/98
Panjer, H. H., Editor, “Financial Economics With Applications to Investments, Insurance
and Pensions”, The Actuarial Foundation, 1998
Peskin, M. W., “Asset/Liability Management in the Public Sector”, presented to Pension
Research Council Conference, 1999
Public Pension Coordinating Council, "2000 Survey of State and Local Retirement
Systems", Data from fiscal 1998 respondents.
Sharpe, W. F., “Corporate Pension Funding Policy“, Journal of Financial Economics,
June 1976, pp. 183-193
Smetters, K., “The Equivalence Between State Contingent Tax Policy and Options: An
Application to Investing the Social Security Trust Fund in Equities”, working paper,
Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania, February, 1999

49

Jeremy Gold

Assumed Rates of Discount for Valuations September 22, 2000
of Publicly Sponsored Defined Benefit Plans

Smetters, K., "Risk Sharing with the Unborn: A New Perspective on Capital Income
Taxes", working paper, Wharton Business School, University of Pennsylvania, March
3, 2000.
Stoufer, J., “Letters”, Pensions and Investments, 5/30/94
Surz, R. J., “Commentary”, Pensions and Investments, 4/4/94
Surz, R. J., “Letters”, Pensions and Investments, 6/13/94
Tepper, I., “Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy“, Journal of Finance, 36, March 1981
Trowbridge, C. L., “Fundamentals of Pension Funding”, TSA No. 4 (1952), pp. 17-43
Trowbridge, C. L., and Farr, C. E., “The Theory and Practice of Pension Funding”,
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1976
Wimpy, Gourmand and Sailorman, P. T., Date Unknown

50

